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EQUALITY+ BARGAINING CHIPS= A~MS RACE
I.

Introduction*

The failure of the United States and the Soviet Union to make
meaningful progress in strategic arms control at the Moscow Summit, and
the bleak outlook for arms control in the immed"iate future suggest that
there is something wrong in the way which armament negotiations are
being approached.

This article argues that in two crucial sets of nego'
~iations--the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and the Mutual and

Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) discussions--the United States has adopted
a bargaining strategy so totally inconsistent with the goals which American spokesmen have announced that it seems to be explicitly designed to
prevent their accomplishment. The argument leading to this conclusion
can be summarized in four points.
1.

In both the SALT and MBFR discussions, the United States is

seeking to control arms competition and, ultimately, to reduce ar~ament
levels.
2.

The United States has established equality of forces as. its
11

11

minimum acceptable outcome in each of these negotiations.
3. The United States is using a bargaining chip strategy in each
11

11

of these negotiations.
4.

Equality and a bargaining chip strategy are, together, sufficient

*Thanks are due to the Center for International Studies, University of
Missouri-St. Louis which suppo~ted this research.
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to prevent arms reduction and are likely to produce a new round of arms
competition.
Stated in this form, the argument requires elaboration and explanation.
At this very high level of abstraction, however, it is possible to see
the mass.ive inconsistency between the current means and ends :of Am~ri can
foreign policy and to understand that United States policy in SALT and
MBFR is inherently self-defeating and requires reformulation.
II. American Goals in SALT and MBFR:
Arms Control, Arms Reduction and Security Through Equality
Th_e United States has long had a goal of halting arms competition
and reduc-ing arms ~evels in both the SALT and MBFR negotiations.

Presi-

dent Nixon enunciated these goals for the SALT discussions before the
· · United Nations General Assembly as early- as September, 1969. 1 Secretary
of Defense Schlesinger noted in the Annual Defense Department Report for
fi seal 1975 that, 11 we are eager to begin a reduction of strategic forces
by mutual agreement. 11 2 The title of the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction negotiations implies committments to lower arms levels.

Joseph J.

Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs,
detailed.American
.
.

MBFR goa·1s in an appearance before the Senate'Committee on Foreign Relations; 11 we and our allies hope by patient negotiating effort to probe
Savi et wi 11 i ngness to address the real issues of rhi li tary security ·in ·
Europe and negotiate an agreement that will maintain the security of
.

.

both East and West at lower levels of confrontation and cost.11

3

Checking arms competition and lowering force levels are not the only
goals of the United States fn these arms control discussions.

Policy

makers are generally careful to include references to security and equality

3

of force levels.

Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for

European Affairs, for example, sees security through equality as the
main U.S. goal in MBFR discussions.
So far, both sides have agreed that MBFR would contribute
to the goal of insuring security and stability in Europe and
that any agreement reached should not diminish the security
of either side . . .
11

"The West has proposed that the final goal of ground force
reductions by both s i de·s be a common ceiling for overa 11
ground force manpower. At present, NATO has 770,000 men in
its ground forces in the area, the Warsaw Pact has 925,000
men. The disparity of nearly 150,000 men between these
figures is a substantial one, and we ·believe the main objective of the negotiations should be to eliminate it. 11,4 _ ·
This desire for security and the accompanying assumption that security
can be achieved only through equality also appears in Dr. Schlesinger's
~xplanation of U.S. goals in SALT II and MBFR.
It is~ . . to put boundaries around arms competition that we
are engaged with the Soviet Union in SALT II. And it is to achieve a similar objective through a more stable balance at
lower force levels in Central Europe, that we and our NATO
Allies are engaged in negotiations on Mutual and Balanced
Force Reductions with the Warsaw Pact states.
11

·

while we pursue negotiations about mutual reductions of
arms . . . it is my judgment that we must maintai'n a world
wide military equilibrium. 11 5
11

Immediately prior to the Moscow Summit, Secretary of State Kissinger
emphasized the American· commi ttment to the notion of equality.
"Our objectives with respect to the control of arms are as
follows:
"Obviously neither side should have a military advantage as
the result of any agreement that may be made.
"Secondly,-neither side should be able to have a political
advantage as a result of any agreements that might be made.
"Thirdly, neither side should believe that such an advantage
exists--even if in reality it does not exist--because the
perception is more important in many respects than reality.
And finally, neither side, no ally, nor interested country
of either side, should have such a perception. 6
11

11
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Thus, American goals in SALT and MBFR are clear--control of arms competition and reduction of force levels while maintaining security.

Pre-

servation of security is seen as requiring approximate equality of force
levels.

Such equality, is not seen as requiring prec.ise matching of the

Soviet Union weapon for weapon in each category.

Rather, terms such as

"essential equality" have been developed in recognition that dissimilar
weapons systems may counter one another.

The best example of this is

reliance by the United States in the late 1960's and early 1~70's on
smaller, more accurate strategic warheads to counter the heavier, less
accurate strategic weapons of the Soviet Union~ A less_ familiar example
is the use by NATO of superior tactical aircraft and logistics capabiliti'es to offset Warsaw Pact numerical advantages in Europe.

American

policy makers assume that equality of forces, whatever form that equality
may take, is a prerequisite to security.
III.

The Means-_-A "Bargaining Chip 11 Negotiating Strategy

"Bargaining chip" is a label, not a precise concept.

As used in

·this essay, the term refers to a practice of developing, deploying or
maintaining forces in order to have resources in negotiations.

In their

most crude form, bargaining chips are an effort to get something for
nothing-~an obsolete weapon is traded for a modern on~, the threat of a
new weapons system is-balanced against an existing system.
Both President Nixon and Secretary of State·Kissinger have repeatedly
argued that a decision by the United States to unilaterally reduce its
ground forces in Europe would be a serious error because it would remove
the incentive for the Warsaw Pact states to negotiate a mutual fotce
reduction.

In this way, the issue of troop withdrawal is not argued on
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its merits--the utility of the forces in Europe and the threat of military attack there--but rather on the utility of the forces as a bargain11

ing chip" to induce concessions in the MBFR negotiations.
In thefiscal 1975 Annual Defense Department Report, Secretary-of
·Defense Schlesinger shows this same horse-trading outlook on the strategic weapons being discussed in SALT.
Strategic programs. : .affect the prospects for arms control
. . • and sRecific programs are the coin of this partictilar
I rea l m. . . 7
11

We are . . . proposing in the FY 1975 budget several strategic
R &D programs ••. as hedges against the unknown outcome of
SALT II and the uncertain actions of the USSR. The United
States is prepared to reduce, stay level, or if need be increase
our level of strategic arms, but in any case, that level will
be fixed by the actions of·the Soviet Union. If the Soviet
Union insists on moving ahead with a new set of strategic
capabilities, we will be forced to match them. We would prefer, however, to reduce the present balance in such a way
that strategic equivalence can be achieved at the lowest
cost and least destabilizing level of forces. 8
11

11

These hedges against unknown outcomes which are also :the coin of
11

11

11

this particular realm are the American bargaining chips in the SALT II
11

negotiations.
IV.

The Inconsistency of Ends and Means

The first three points of the argument can virtually be stipulated.
The United States is seeking to curb arms competition and reduce force
levels.

Equality of forces is the minimum acceptable outcome enunciated

by American spokesmen in both the SALT and MBFR discussions.

The United

States is taking a bargaining chip approach to these negotiations,

So

what? All these things may be true, but they are unimportant unless
the combination of desire for equality and bargaining chip negotiating_
strategy_ can be shown to prevent arms reduction and increase the chances
of a new round of arms competition.
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The notion of equality of forces, by itself, does not present any
inherent obstacle to meaningful arms control.

Equal forces are perhaps

the most stable of all levels--neither side has an advantage on which
it might be tempted to build toward superiority; neither is behind and
likely to embark on new weapons development or deployment out of fear of
enemy doniinance.

Moreover, equality is not, ·by itself, in any way incon-

sistent with force reduction.

Weapons equivalence at lower levels is

an option in arms negotiations.
Nor are bargaining chi~ strategies an inherent obstacle to the
·halting of arms competition. The agreements reached at the Washington
Naval Conference in 1922 were, ·in essence, an agreement by the United
States to abandon a massive shipbuilding program begun during World
War I, in return for naval restraint on the part of other powers.

Simi-

larly, the Soviet Uni6n received a major concession in throw-weight from
I

the United States in theSALT I negotiations in return for a temporary
agreement limiting the number of launchers deployed.

In those same nego-

tiations, the United States gave up an Anti~Ballistic Missile (ABM) system of uncertain feasibility and facing considerable Congressional opposition in exchange for a limit on ABM deployments.
There are, however, serious problems with bargaining chip strategies.No intelligent opponent will trade something for no~hing.

No one would

accuse the negotiators of the Soviet Union or the other Warsaw Pactstates
of being fools.

Hence, bargaining chips must be given credibility.

For

new weapons systems,.credibility is derived fr_om vigorous research, development and testing programs as well as public discussion of the need for
,.

the new weapons.

For obsolete weapons systems, this means stubborn

)

.
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defense of the utility and importance of the weapons system. Where old
functions are no longer needed, new uses must be found.

There can be

no signs of weakness or lack of determination in the development, deployment or maintenance of bargaining chips.

Programs must move forward

steadily.
There are two negative consequences of this strategy.
weapons systems develop a momeDtum of their own.

First, new

This momentum is com-

posed of money invested, project phases completed, civilian and military
clientele groups who see personal and professional achievements in the
program.

Second, both obsolete and new weapons systems attract a group

of believers--persons in the public, scholarly community and decisionmaking circles who become convinced that the prog~ams are important .
. It is in exactly this manner that the opportunity to negotiate a
ban on Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicles (MIRV 1 s) was
lost.

The momentum of the new weapons system carried the program into

the testing and deployment phases during the SA~T I negotiations.

Once

the United Stcites had tested these weapons the Soviet Union would n~t
accept a ban on them since "national means of verification'.' (relied upon
exclusively in the SALT I agreements) are not sufficient tri detect
changes in warhead deployment, while they can be relied upon to detect
testing of the new warheads.

Hence, MIRV, potentially a destabilizing

force in the nuclear balance becaus~ it could be used as the basis for
building a first-strike force, remains today unchecked and is a major
obstacle to further strategic arms limitation.
In a similar fashion, the impassioned defense of obsolete weapons
systems such as the fo~ward based nuclear forces of the United States,

8

the B-52 bomber force and the large numbers of American ground troops
in Europe tends to frustrate negotiations about arms reduction.

The

public defense of such systems and the search for new functions to show
their 11 indispensabiliti 1 leads to a position in which they cannot be
abandoned.

This, in turn, puts a floor under force levels and prevents

arms reduction.
In addition,to the tendency for new weapons systems used as bargaining chips to become full fledged weapons systems and of obsolete systems
to become 11 indispensable 11 when placed in that role, bargaining chips
have another deleterious effect--they tend to beget other bargaining
chips.

This can take two forms--(1) you get what you pay for and (2)

arms escalation.

-

The Washington Naval Conference was a good example of
.

trading one bargaining chip for another.

The famous 5:5:3 deal in which

the U.S. and Great Britain agreed to equal naval forces while the Japanese
agreed to not exceed 60% of their forces was actually a deal where no
one gave up very much.

The United States abandoned a massive· shipbuild-

ing program which Congress was very unlikely to fund at anything like
its original wartjme level.

Great Britain, financially in trouble and

afraid the United States was cha 11 engi ng her to a nav.a.l arms race, saw
that threat ended and made concessions which largely amouhted to scrapping large numbers of battleships and heavy_ cruisers which' had been
rendered obsolete by rapidly changing naval technology.

Japan agreed

not to exceed a fleet level-which was well abo~e her 1922 force level and
which she was not likely to achieve for many years anyway.
this same tendency to trade one bargaining chip for another.

SALT I showed
An Ameri-

can agreement to limit ABM deployment with Congress unlikely to vote
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I

sufficient funds for deployment anyway was traded for Soviet agreement .
to stop increasing the number of her Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
and Submarine Based Ballistic M,issiles at a time when it now appears
.

.

the Soviets desired to test a new generation of mi-ssiles rather than
deploy larger numbers of the existing ones.

At the recent Moscow summit

the agreem~nt to limit ABM' s to only one site in each ,country at a time
when neither the U.S. nor the U.S.S.R. had plans to construct a second
site, was a trade of meaningless bargaihing chips.

This trad~ng of

"chip" for "chip" may be arms control of a sort, but it certainly creates
no incentive or pressure for arms reduction.
In order to negate a bargaining chip strategy, an opponent ~ust have_
chips of his own, particularly if the initial position is one of approximate force equality.

Given force equality, trading a mea ni ngfu l arms

program for a bargaining chip means an outcome below equality.

Hence,

preparations for negotiations must include the preparation of bargaining
chips.

This means vigorous research and development of new weapons

systems, vigorous defense of the importance of old ~ystems and a public
position of resolve not to be the lesser of two powers.

Hence, given a

position of equality, a goal of future equality and a bargaining chip
strategy, negotiations must concern themselves with cancelling the bargaining chips of ;the opponent.
tion.

There is no pressure towards arms reduc-

Moreover, if an assymetrical deal is made (one side makes an

error) or if no deal is made at all, or if even a pottion of the bargaining chips are excluded from the agreement (remember MIRV) then an increase
in the quantity or quality of forces wi 11 occur. In other words, the
combination of goals of equality ·and a strategy of bargaining chips is

I
I
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sufficient to _prevent arms reduction and is likely to produce a new
I

round of arms competition.
V.

Resolution of the Problem

At the high level of abstraction atwhich this cfitique is being
made, resolution of the problem does not appear difficult.

The United

States could avoid the inconsistency between ends and means by changing

II

either the ends or the means.

I

could be modified.

I

The goal of checking arms competition

The requirement of equality could be abandoned.

I

Or,

I
II

the bargainin~ chip strategy could be changed.
While solution of the problem through any of these three kinds of
action is possible, some are clearly prefer~ble to others.

Abandoning

goals of arms limitation and reduction.•would be an error--it would be
allowing choice of means to dictate choiGe of ends and it would lead
toward expensive and dangerous arms competition.

The goal of security

through equality is· perhaps more amenable to change.

The basic goal

here is security and the linkage between security and equality is one
which, while widely accepted by policy-makers, has not been clearly
demonstrated. · NATO has lived for years with ground force assymetry in
Europe.
11

Not long ago the Nixon administration was explaining that

strategic sufficiency 11 rather than 11 essential equality 11 was the standard

by which the str"ategic weapons balance should be measured.

I

I

j

It seems clear

that some strategic gap is tolerable, though deciding exactly how much
of a gap is safe at a partitular time is not an· easy task.

Politically,

of course, few American leaders are willing to put themselves in a position where· they can be charged with al lowing the United States to become

I

a second 11 military power.
11

It might not-be too much to ask of the

i

I

I

11

administration which reopened relations with Chitia and provided nuclear
capabilities·to Egypt without arousing public wrath to explain that some
force assymetrymight be desirable as a way of inducing genuine force
reductions. Probably the most promising way of avoiding the current inconsistency between means and ends, however, is to alter the bargaining chip
approach to these key negotiations.

Senator Case has recently suggested

how this might be done.
"If we assume tha·t all countries want to reduce arms and reduce the expense of arms and reduce the risks that they bring
to us, is not the best way to get this done just to start to
do it. I do not mean to lay yourself naked to your enemies
or anything ·like that but I mean take a particular i tern and
· say, 1 we are going to do this now! 1· It would not be a vital
risk . . • I mean something that would be a definite forward
step and move inch by inch or foot by foot in that way. 9

I

·I

I

11

This general approach, use of unilate·ral initiatives clearly and publicly made, might be productive because, unlike "bargaining chipf,

11

it

does create a public pressure and ·a momentum toward lower force levels.
Ii would appear that th~ United States is in a position today to
make this type of gesture in both the MBFR and SALT II negotiations.
In MBFR, the U.S. co~ld announce~ sthedule.of redactiori in the forward
based nuclear forces in Europe or of ground troops stationed there.
These would not have to be hurried withdrawals, nor would they necessarily lead toward withdrawaJ of all forces.

They could be viewed as

initiatives and the Wars~w Pact states could then be publicly challenged
to match them.
Europe.

There.seem to be room for lower force levels in Western

The threat of armed conflict along those borders has greatly

decreased from the early 1950 s, and the utility of forward nuclear
1

forces has fallen greatly with the development and deployment of SLBM's
and ICBM' s ..

12

In SALT, the United States could also make meaningful arms reductions without seriously endangering the security of the Western hemisphere.

B-52 strategic bombers were originally designed more tha.n 25

years ago and make only a marginal contribution to strategic stability
today.

Rather than replacing them with the new B-1 bomber, they could

be phased out.

In SALT, also, forward based nuclear weapons provide an

area where unilateral arms reduction initiatives are possible. ·over
the somewhat longer time span, stationary, land-based ICBM' s might provide a similar opportunity.

Fred C. Ikle, Director of the Arms Control

.and Disarmament Agency, recently testified that these weapons systems
are becoming obsolete because of the capacity of satellites to detect
their locations and-the improving accuracy bf offensive nuclear warheads.10 The United States could take the initiative and announce a
program of phasing out these weapons before they are redu·ced, by the

I
I

I

'I

relentless march of technology, to relatively useless bargaining chips.
Of course, not all of these steps should be taken, at least not
all at once.

The examples are furnished to demonstrate that there are

major arms reduction initiatives which the United States might take to
create a pressure and mome_ntum toward the goal of lower force levels.
It should also beclear that this proposal is not a call for unilateral
disarmament.

What is being suggested is essentially a bargaini~g stra-

tegy designed to create a climate in which achievements of the policy
goals already enunciated by administration spokesmen becomes possible.
The risk level of such initJatives-would be quite low, though some force
assymetry might result, and the potential reward--genuine arms reduction
--quite high.

I

I
I
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One final point should be made.

Those who disagree with the argu-

ment~ presented here will no doubt note that the.problem being discussed
is created by the interaction of United States policy.and the policies
of the Soviet Union; while the criticism and call for action are directed
only at American decision makers;

Such a point is well tak~n~

I would

certainly hope to see Soviet decision makers taking the initiative in
reducing arms levels.

Nevertheless·, American policy makers are respon'.'"

sible for taking action which can be expected to produce the desired
outcomes.

The massive inconsistency between current U.S. policy goals

·and the negotiating· strategy being utilized leaves virtually no chance
'

'

"

.

that the goal· of arms reduction can be achiev.ed and presents

a serious

danger of initiating future arms competition .. United States decision.
makers are under an obligation to take actions which wi 11 rectify this
inconsistency between American goals and American means.

. I

